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Securities Trading of Concepts (STOC) 
Abstract 
Identifying winning new product concepts can be a challenging process that requires 
insight into private consumer preferences.  In order to measure consumer preferences for new 
product concepts, we apply a securities-trading approach where new product concepts are traded 
as financial securities: Securities Trading of Concepts (STOC).  We apply this method because 
market prices are well known to efficiently collect and aggregate private information regarding 
the economic value of goods, services, and firms, particularly when trading financial securities.  
Our research includes the first application of securities markets to test potential new product 
concepts, and is the first to compare such an approach against stated-choice, conjoint, constant-
sum and longitudinal revealed preference data.  In our research, we place STOC in the context of 
existing methodologies, as well as prior research on prediction markets and experimental 
economics.  In the process, we put forth four hypotheses to test empirically through a series of 
experiments in multiple product categories, that STOC: 1) is more cost-efficient than other 
methods; 2) passes validity tests; 3) measures expectations of others; and 4) reveals individual 
preferences, not just those of the crowd.  All hypotheses are confirmed, with the notable 
exception that STOC does not accurately predict actual product market shares and price 
sensitivity.  Our results also show that traders exhibit bias based on self-preferences when 
trading.  Ultimately, STOC offers two key advantages to traditional market research methods—
cost efficiency and scalability.  For new product development (NPD) teams deciding where to 
invest product-development resources, this scalability may be especially important in the Web 
2.0 world where customers are constantly interacting with firms and with each other in 
suggesting numerous product design possibilities that need to be screened. 
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1 Introduction 
New product innovation depends on a firm’s ability to both generate many potentially winning 
concepts and accurately distinguish between winners and losers.  Preferences for some new 
product categories are primarily attribute-based, and are therefore most amenable to 
decompositional methods such as conjoint analysis.  However, the Web 2.0 world, where 
customers interact with firms and each other in suggesting numerous and complex product 
design possibilities, demands a more accurate and scalable filtering method for identifying most 
promising integrated product concepts.   
We propose that Securities Trading of Concepts (STOC), wherein new product concepts 
are traded as financial securities, can potentially serve as this filter, helping to identify winning 
new product concepts, such as those with market appeal, during the early and lower investment 
phases of new product development.  The reason STOC may work well is that securities markets 
are well-known to efficiently collect and aggregate diverse information regarding value using the 
simple summary statistic of price (Hayek 1945).  Rather than summarizing economic value, the 
security prices in STOC measure intensity of preference among the traders for competing new 
product concepts because traders receive multiple votes and they can show the strength of their 
votes with the number of their shares that they allocate. 
When compared to existing preference measurement research methods such as surveys, 
voice-of-the-customer methods, conjoint analysis, concept tests, and focus groups, STOC has 
potential cost and scale advantages due to its attractiveness to respondents and the way in which 
it collects multiple answers from each respondent.  Despite similarities in outward appearance 
and implementation to prediction markets, STOC differs significantly in that it measures 
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preferences for concepts that may never be realized rather than observable outcomes and 
controls for the effects of outside news, both of which we’ll discuss in more detail shortly.   
The present research hypothesizes that: 1) STOC compares favorably to extant methods; 
2) STOC passes validity tests; 3) STOC measures expectations of others; and 4) STOC may also 
reveal individual preferences if traders make buying and selling decisions partially based on their 
personal preferences, and use them to form expectations of others’ preferences.  We test these 
hypotheses empirically through a series of experiments in multiple product categories.  In each 
experiment, STOC is tested against traditional market research methods applicable to new 
product concepts.   
The present research is aimed at illuminating the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
STOC, with the hope of better informing the market for preference measurement techniques.  
The paper proceeds by providing a brief overview of the STOC concept and methodology in 
section 2.  Section 3 compares STOC to existing methods.  Section 4 presents four STOC 
hypotheses, while section 5, the results.  Section 6 discusses the results, managerial implications, 
deficiencies and conclusions. 
2 The STOC Concept and Methodology 
The STOC methodology centers around hypothetical consumers trading hypothetical 
securities (each associated with a product or service concept), in virtual stock markets.  The five 
key steps in designing a STOC game are summarized in Table 3.  Each participant receives an 
initial portfolio of cash (virtual or real) and virtual stocks.  Participants are also provided with 
detailed information on the product concepts that include specifications, images, and multimedia 
illustrations.  A typical objective of the STOC game might be for each participant to maximize 
the value of his or her portfolio, evaluated at the closing stock prices or the volume-weighted-
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average prices (VWAP).  Markets are typically open for 20 to 30 minutes and end at random 
times.  STOC’s high speed derives from the lack of outside news which allows prices to 
converge quickly.  If participants play with real money, they will have the opportunity to profit 
from trading and will conversely bear the risk of losing money.  The financial stakes in the game 
provide incentives for participants to reveal true preferences, process information, and conduct 
research.  If fictitious money is used, prizes can be awarded according to individuals’ 
performances.  One can also reward all participants simply for their service. 
As in real financial markets, stock prices are determined by supply and demand, which 
depend on participants’ evaluation of their own and others’ preferences for the underlying 
products.  Thus, at the market equilibrium, prices should fully reflect all participants’ aggregate 
preference of the products being tested.  Traders make trading decisions just as they would in a 
financial stock market: they assess the values of the stocks, sell overvalued ones and buy 
undervalued ones, essentially voting on the worth of the underlying products.  In this way, a 
stock’s price becomes a convenient index of a product’s consumer value.  In our STOC tests, all 
trades require a specific buyer to purchase shares from a specific seller, both of whom have 
placed a limit order (i.e., we employ a double auction with no market makers); one could also 
employ market making software that enables one-sided trades in “thin” markets with few traders 
as Hanson (2003, 2005, 2009) proposes.  Technical details of the web-based STOC trading 
system can be found in Web Appendix 1 at the following URL (JMR web appendix URL here). 
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3 STOC vs. Existing Consumer Preference Measurement Methods  
3.1 Potential Benefits vs. Other Market Research Methods 
STOC may be compared against existing, well-established methods for estimating 
consumer preferences.  For example, 1) surveys (cf. Burchill and Brodie 1997), 2) voice-of-the-
customer methods (cf. Griffin and Hauser 1993), 3) conjoint analysis (cf. Srinivasan and Shocker 
1973, Green and Wind 1981, Green and Srinivasan 1990), 4) concept tests (cf. Urban, Hauser 
and Roberts 1990, Dahan and Srinivasan 2001, Dahan and Hauser 2002), and 5) focus groups 
(cf. Mahajan and Wind 1992, Calder 1977, Fern 1982). 
STOC offers five potential benefits over most preference measurement methods: 
1. Accuracy Due to Incentive Compatibility: STOC traders have the incentive to trade based 
on their most accurate perceptions of others’ preferences since they are more likely to 
perform well in the game by doing so.  Moreover, STOC overcomes certain social biases 
because the method doesn’t directly reveal potentially sensitive private information or 
preferences, as might happen with traditional methods of individual data collection.  STOC 
also continuously captures the intensity and degree of preference in ways that surveys 
typically do not, e.g., by weighting multiple trades of varying volume based on the total 
amount of capital committed.  STOC’s validity and accuracy can be empirically tested by 
comparing its preference measurement results against those of the traditional methods. 
2. Interactive Learning: STOC traders learn from each other through the price mechanism.  
Since participants observe each other’s valuations of the product concepts, they can update 
and adjust their own valuations dynamically in the market environment.  Learning may 
reduce response error, especially as STOC prices converge.  Learning may be especially 
useful for fashion goods for which individual preference may depend at least partially on the 
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opinions of others.  A downside of learning is that STOC’s revelation of prices (at least to the 
group of traders) hurts the firm’s ability to keep the results private.  STOC’s learning effects 
can be measured by asking traders the same preference questions immediately before and 
after trading, and calculating which responses better capture actual preferences, and which 
have lower variance. 
3. Scalability: Unlike surveys, in which the number of questions asked is limited by the 
capacity of each respondent to answer, securities markets are intrinsically scalable due to the 
fact that each trader need only evaluate a small subset of the universe of securities.  Dahan, 
et. al. (2010) specifically demonstrate scalability limited only by the total number of traders, 
and outline experimental designs that group any number of traders into sub groups.  The 
efficiency of the market, and therefore the quality of data collected, improves with the 
number of participants.  This extends to the number of product concepts that may be 
evaluated—since there is no requirement that each respondent trade every security, the 
bounded rationality of the traders does not limit the number of concepts that can be evaluated 
in a STOC market.  Limiting the number of securities seen by each trader to a small subset of 
the full gamut of ideas being tested also mitigates the aforementioned risk of public 
revelation. 
4. Integrated Product Concepts: Like Dahan and Srinivasan’s (2000) Virtual Concept Testing 
(VCT), the STOC method is particularly useful relative to conjoint methods when a product 
cannot be easily quantified, delineated, or represented by a set of attributes (for example, a 
movie script, fashion item, car body style, or piece of art).  Market participants evaluate the 
integrated product concepts directly, and market prices effectively reflect the overall viability 
of the concepts, including the ability of a concept to fulfill unarticulated needs.  All that is 
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required is a thorough physical depiction of each concept.  While STOC could also be used 
to measure preferences for product attributes and their levels, as demonstrated by Dahan et. 
al. (2010), such an approach might make more sense as a complement to conjoint analysis 
rather than a substitute, for example as a way of filtering from a larger set of possible 
attributes to a smaller one more manageable in conjoint.  STOC may also outperform 
conjoint in predicting choice share for highly integrated, aesthetic product concepts such as 
Wii video games since their attributes are harder to define. 
5. Recruiting Cost Economics 
STOC is potentially more cost efficient when compared to other consumer preference 
testing methods if respondents prefer trading to answering surveys, and if more data is collected 
per respondent.  The economics of any concept testing method depend largely on the costs of 
recruiting and then compensating a sample of N respondents willing to accurately share their 
preferences about M concepts.  The firm must recruit more than N subjects as response rates are 
likely to be below 100%, and the costs per person for recruiting and compensation may vary 
based on the “attractiveness” of the preference measurement method being employed.  The total 
respondent-related costs can be summarized as follows (derived in Appendix 1): 
(1) 
 
. 
The five key factors influencing the total respondent cost of measuring preferences for M given 
concepts, and the challenge underlying each of these factors is summarized in Table 1. 
## Insert Table 1 here ## 
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Hypothesis 1 
In fact, we hypothesize that STOC improves all five cost measures simultaneously by being 
more attractive to respondents (lowering crecruit and improving r%), and, by virtue of being a 
competition rather than a straight survey, more motivating (improving qrespondent) and engaging 
(lowering crespondent).  The sample size required should be smaller since respondents learn from 
each other and respond with expectations about the population mean, thus reducing error and 
variance, and each provide multiple data points (reducing Nsample) in the form of trades.  These 
effects are testable, as in the following two hypotheses: 
H1a. STOC is more attractive to respondents: Respondents will prefer trading in 
STOC games over answering market research surveys covering an equal number 
of product concepts. 
H1b. STOC requires smaller sample sizes for an equal amount of information. 
Both hypotheses are confirmed, although the results are primarily based on simple 
observations and surveys.  Hypothesis H1a was empirically tested with surveys of 63 real world 
executives and engineers at a telecommunications firm and 113 MBA students, each of whom 
completed market research surveys and played STOC games for the same product concepts on 
the same day.  Both groups expressed strong preferences for STOC over the surveys (90% and 
85%, respectively).   
Hypothesis H1b is demonstrated by virtue of the small sample sizes in each of eleven 
STOC experiments, with trader groups ranging in size from 18 to 56, with a median size of 38 
traders.  The traditional market research methods against which the STOC results are compared 
involved much larger respondent samples, typically 100 to 300 respondents, yet the results from 
both approaches are comparable in quality, as we shall see shortly. 
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That STOC would require smaller sample sizes makes intuitive sense.  Traditional market 
research typically requires respondent sample sizes of 50–300, or more, to allow for 
heterogeneity in preference, and most concept tests measure preferences for 5–12 concepts at a 
time due to cognitive constraints, so 4–50 respondents per concept tested is typical.  Our STOC 
experiments, on the other hand, reveal that 1–2 traders per concept stock is sufficient to produce 
stable results.  The amount required to recruit potential respondents and compensate those 
completing the exercise can typically be reduced by half or more due to their preference for 
playing the game.  Thus, by cutting sample size in half and recruiting costs per respondent by a 
similar amount, STOC could potentially reduce the total respondent costs of a concept preference 
study by 75% or more.  Since the infrastructure costs of running the STOC trading system are 
essentially fixed, we anticipate long term variable cost savings from STOC testing. 
3.2 Prediction Markets 
Beyond the other well-established methods for estimating consumer preferences 
discussed above, there exists non-financial “prediction markets” used to forecast political 
elections, movie box office data, and other real world outcomes.  The Iowa Electronic Markets 
(IEM)1 pioneered prediction markets for the purpose of forecasting election results (Forsythe, 
Nelson, Neumann & Wright 1993).  The IEM is operated by the University of Iowa College of 
Business for research and teaching.  These markets are small-scale, real-money futures markets 
where contract payoffs depend on economic and political events such as elections, meaning that 
traders receive incentives based on how they predict future events.  The IEM features real-money 
futures markets in which contract payoffs depend on the outcome of political and economic 
                                                 
1 The Iowa Electronic Markets, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/ 
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events. IEM’s predictions have outperformed most national polls.2  Similarly, the Hollywood 
Stock Exchange, HSX.com, has provided accurate predictions of movie box office results (Spann 
and Skiera 2003).  The Foresight Exchange (FX)3 predicts the probability of future events 
occurring such as changes in the environment, scientific breakthroughs, the collapse of 
companies, or political and news outcomes.  Companies such as Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, 
Best Buy and Google have employed internal prediction markets to forecast printer sales, 
software release dates, consumer electronics sales, and software take-up rates.   
Such prediction markets share with STOC the benefits of information aggregation, the 
joy of competitive play, the ability to learn from others, and the incentive to be accurate.  
Prediction markets focus on actual outcomes, operate for weeks, months, and sometimes years, 
and incorporate private information and news as it happens.  STOC markets, in contrast, focus on 
concepts that may never come into existence, and therefore may never have actual outcomes, run 
for a much shorter time period—10–60 minutes typically, and are not influenced or complicated 
by outside news.  In fact, the only information available to STOC traders is the personal 
preferences they hold, their expectations of others’ preferences, and whatever they learn by 
observing price movements during trading. 
3.3 Rational Expectations (RE) Models and Experimental Markets 
STOC is also closely related to the literatures in rational expectations (RE) models with 
asymmetric information and experimental markets.  RE is an economic hypothesis that states that 
agents’ predictions of the future value of economically relevant variables is not systematically 
incorrect because all the errors are random.  RE is used in many contemporary macroeconomic 
models, game theory, and other applications of rational choice theory.  In a standard asymmetric 
                                                 
2 BusinessWeek, 11/11/96  
3 The Foresight Exchange, http://www.ideosphere.com/fx 
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information RE model (Grossman, 1981), heterogeneous agents with diverse information trade 
with each other and, under certain conditions, the market will converge to an equilibrium in 
which prices fully reveal all relevant information.  The most important criterion for convergence 
is that agents condition their beliefs on market information.  In particular, agents make inferences 
from market prices and quantities about other agents’ private information. 
The RE model has received considerable attention in the study of experimental markets 
(Plott and Sunder, 1982, 1988; Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990; Davis and Holt, 1993).  Studies of 
the informational efficiency of a market relative to the RE benchmark fall into two categories:  
markets with fully informed agents (“insiders”) and uninformed agents, and markets with many 
partially informed agents.  In various experimental markets with human subjects, the results for 
both market structures are the same: markets eventually converge to the RE equilibrium, i.e., 
information aggregation and dissemination occur successfully. 
STOC trading shares some characteristics with such experimental economics markets, 
and information aggregation and dissemination provide compelling explanation for the success 
of our experiments.  For example, traders who possess superior information about the products, 
or have high confidence in their beliefs, can be considered “insiders.” On the other hand, traders 
who have little knowledge or opinion of the products can be regarded as the “uninformed.”  The 
interaction between the insider and uninformed constitutes information dissemination.  What is 
intriguing about this scenario is that even when a subset of traders ignores the underlying product 
information and only focuses on market information, the market still converges to efficient prices 
that aggregate all the relevant information and beliefs.  A striking example of just how 
informationally efficient financial markets can be is provided by Maloney and Mulherin (2003), 
who document the fact that in the wake of the Space Shuttle Challenger’s explosion in 1986, the 
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stock price of Morton Thiokol—the vendor who was ultimately held responsible for the 
infamous failed O-ring in the booster rocket—dropped precipitously within minutes after the 
explosion, and much more so than any other vendors’ stock prices during the same period.  In 
our own experiments, post-STOC-trading surveys of the traders (Figure 1) reveal that the 
majority base their trades more on what is happening during the game than on their underlying 
preferences for the product concepts, and that their expectations of others changed a lot while 
trading. 
Alternatively, individual traders may form their own beliefs about the products, 
acknowledging that market prices will depend on aggregate beliefs.  This is similar to the 
information aggregation scenario in which there are no “insiders”, but where all traders are 
partially informed.  Even in this case, where no single trader has full information, an RE 
equilibrium will be reached under very general conditions (Grossman, 1981; Davis and Holt, 
1993, Chapter 7).  
However, there is one important difference between STOC markets and the other 
exchanges in the experimental markets literature.  In a typical experimental market, subjects’ 
preferences and their information set are fixed and assigned by the researchers. Therefore, even 
before trading begins, theoretical equilibrium prices can be calculated.  In contrast, in a STOC 
market, neither the subjects’ preferences nor their information sets are known—in fact, these are 
what STOC market trading experiments are meant to discover.  This suggests an important 
practical consideration in implementing STOC markets: the composition of traders should match 
the population of target consumers as closely as possible, or at least include traders with insight 
into the preferences of these consumers.  For example, if the target population for a particular 
product is teenage female consumers, a STOC market consisting of middle-age males may not 
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yield particularly useful preference rankings for that product.  However, if the cross section of 
traders in a STOC market is representative of the target population, the force of market 
rationality will ensure that the price-discovery mechanism will provide an accurate measure of 
aggregate preferences.  We demonstrate the importance of selecting representative traders in our 
experiments on Wii video games by having two groups of traders with distinct preferences trade 
the identical (8) eight video game concepts, with the outcomes differing dramatically. 
3.4 Some Possible Challenges Related to STOC and Markets in General 
It is important to note some of the possible downsides related to STOC and to markets in 
general, however.  STOC requires simultaneous participation by a group of subjects, the size of 
which grows linearly in the number of concepts being tested.  It also requires specialized trading 
system software and communications infrastructure.  The methodology is laid out in detail in the 
web appendix.  Despite the proven accuracy of prediction markets forecasting election outcomes, 
movie box office receipts, and sporting events, just to name a few, healthy skepticism about 
securities markets remains.  This skepticism has only been reinforced by the perceived market 
failures of the last few years, all of which suggests an uphill battle for the diffusion of market-
based methods in general, and STOC in particular. 
Of course, in general, market-based methods for eliciting information also have certain 
limitations.  Unlike typical marketing research techniques in which information is collected from 
individuals and aggregated in subsequent analysis, the market method focuses on aggregate 
beliefs and preferences.  While individual heterogeneity is not easily observed from market 
prices, it does enter the trading process in the form of differences in security valuation.  Later we 
propose a metric of trader bias and show that individual preferences may be recovered using the 
fact that STOC security prices are stationary.  Moreover, virtual concepts markets may be 
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vulnerable to price manipulations and speculative bubbles because the values of virtual securities 
hinge on the aggregate beliefs, which are endogenously determined within the same market.  
Traders may form false beliefs that could cause prices to deviate from their fundamentals.  And 
all of the behavioral critiques that have been leveled against the Efficient Markets Hypothesis in 
the financial economics literature (see, for example, Shefrin, 2005) apply to concepts markets as 
well.  For these reasons, the market method must be applied with caution, and the consistency of 
the results must be checked through repeated STOC market tests of the same concepts or other 
means of validation.  The greatest level of vulnerability may occur when traders have a poor 
sense of their own preferences or of those of other people.  This might occur, for example, when 
the product category is too new for traders to grasp, or when the stimuli shown prior to trading 
are unclear or confusing (as we demonstrate in one experiment shortly).  Another drawback, as 
already touched on briefly above, is that STOC publicly exposes the tested concepts to a group 
of respondents, which may be problematic in the case of sensitive, proprietary intellectual 
property.  While other concept testing methods have similar problems, the interactive nature of 
trading may make it more difficult to contain the problem of information leaks. 
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4 Testing the STOC Methodology 
To validate the STOC method, we compare it against alternative methods of measuring 
preferences for new product concepts.  We present results for eleven STOC experiments, 
summarized in Table 2, in four product categories, the product attributes of which appear in: 
Figure 1: Crossover Vehicle Trader Attitudes Before and After Trading ( n = 77 ) 
 
Figure 21) bicycle pumps (Dahan and Srinivasan, 2000), 2) laptop computer messenger 
bags (Toubia, et. al., 2003), 3) crossover vehicles (Dahan and Hauser, 2002), and 4) Wii video 
games. 
## Insert Table 2 here ## 
Traders in seven of the tests were MBA and Executive MBA students, but four additional 
STOC tests included management level attendees from the MIT Center for Electronic Business 
conference (crossover vehicle test 3), senior global executives attending executive education 
classes (crossover vehicle test 4) and UCLA Executive MBA’s (Wii video games in tests 2 and 
3).  All eleven tests were run under controlled conditions in a business school trading laboratory 
or corporate classroom. 
17 
The resulting securities prices, normalized to sum to 100 in each experiment, are compared 
against six stated-choice and revealed preference approaches: rank-ordered choice, conjoint 
analysis, virtual concept testing, actual purchase decisions in a simulated store and in actual 
automotive markets, and constant-sum voting.  We find that results across different market 
experiments in the four product categories are reliable across repeated tests and predictive of 
stated-choice and revealed preference results, but less so of longitudinal sales data. 
More specifically, we begin our experiments in 2000 by conducting two STOC tests of 
Dahan and Srinivasan (2000)’s bicycle pump concepts, depicted as static images resembling the 
physical prototypes examined by their respondents. 
## Insert Figure 3 ## 
We employ their physical prototype, conjoint analysis, and static web virtual concept test 
results for bicycle pumps in hopes of validating the STOC method.  Both bicycle pump STOC 
experiments were run on the opposite coast several years after the original data were collected, 
and were conducted with the same group of traders as a method of measuring test-to-test 
repeatability. 
Toubia, et. al’s (2003) laptop PC messenger bags offer an excellent data set for validating 
STOC, as their data set consists of customizable laptop PC messenger bags sold for real money 
through a simulated store to 330 MBA students.  We focus on eight randomly chosen bags, 
representing a range of popularity (choice share), that were actually “sold” to 43% of the 
respondents in their research.  To test whether STOC could predict the simulated store choice 
shares, two STOC tests were run to measure preferences for the same eight bags, but employing 
two different forms of stimuli: the table shown in Figure 6 and the individual images shown in 
Figure 7. 
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## Insert Figure 6 and Figure 7## 
Beginning in 2000, we also tested eight crossover vehicles, as in Dahan and Hauser 
(2001), in four STOC experiments.  Three crossover vehicles had already been released (Lexus, 
Mercedes, and BMW) and five were yet-to-be-released (Pontiac, Acura, Buick, Audi and 
Toyota) at the time of the STOC experiments.  In the six following years, we collected unit sales 
data for each of the eight vehicles from Ward’s Automotive News.  These data are used as a test 
of external validity and the predictive power of the STOC method. 
Finally, in 2009, we conducted three STOC experiments using 19 Wii video game 
concepts developed by student teams competing with each other in two UCLA MBA courses.  
Each video game concept included game play software as well as at least one piece of original 
hardware, i.e. a peripheral device that would enhance game play and work with the Wii console’s 
motion-detecting, force-sensing and/or WiFi features. 
Each Wii video game concept was also defined by its feature levels for six conjoint attributes in 
a study completed by each of the 90 students as well as 160 outside respondents as seen in Figure 
1: Crossover Vehicle Trader Attitudes Before and After Trading ( n = 77 ) 
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Figure 2. 
The concepts proposed by the 35 students competing on 8 teams in an elective course on 
New Product Development are depicted in Figure 8, while those proposed by 55 Executive MBA 
students comprising 11 teams in a core Marketing course are shown in Figure 9. 
## Insert Figure 8 and Figure 9 ##  
After presenting their concepts to each other at the final session of their respective courses, the 
students used constant-sum voting to complete three surveys: (1) SELF Preferences for all 
concepts except their own (which determined project grades); (2) Expectations of Others’ 
Preferences for all eight concepts (with recognition for the “best guessers”); and (3) expectations 
of the eight average STOC Prices just prior to trading.  After trading was completed, the students 
completed a fourth, constant-sum “Post-STOC” survey utilizing what they had learned from 
trading to re-estimate the mean preferences for all eight Wii Video Game concepts. 
Wii video game Test 2 was identical to Test 1, except that the 55 Executive Education 
students completing the four surveys and playing the STOC game judged the eight concepts from 
the other class.  That is, they had no involvement in the development of those eight concepts.  In 
Test 3, the Executive MBA students evaluated the 11 game concepts that their own teams had 
developed. 
We are grateful for the cooperation of the aforementioned researchers who enabled us to 
utilize the identical product concept illustrations in our STOC tests.  Thus, we are able to 
compare results for identical market research problems using STOC versus prior methods. 
For the first eight STOC experiments, traders were told that their final portfolio 
valuations would be based on the closing prices of each stock, plus the cash they had left on 
hand.  For the final three experiments testing Wii video game concepts, traders were told that 
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final portfolio valuations would be based not on closing prices, but rather on mean prices 
throughout the trading period (i.e. using volume-weighted-average-prices).  A common user 
interface, shown below, was employed for each of the eleven STOC tests, each of which ran in 
under one hour including instructions and wrap up. 
## Insert Figure 11 ## 
The STOC tests allow us to confirm hypotheses about: (1) the validity of STOC’s preference 
measurements, (2) whether STOC prices measures individual preferences or traders’ 
expectations about others’ preferences, and (3) whether STOC reveals individual preferences 
even when traders focus on other people. Six hypotheses testing STOC’s validity include: 
H2a. Convergent Validity with VCT: Web-based virtual concept testing (VCT) and 
constant-sum voting are highly correlated with STOC prices. 
H2b. Convergent Validity with Conjoint Analysis: Conjoint Analysis and STOC results 
are highly correlated. 
H2c. Test-to-test Repeatability: Repeated STOC test results are highly correlated when 
run with the same traders or two groups of traders with similar preferences, but 
uncorrelated when run with groups of traders with distinct preferences. 
H2d. Simulated Store Predictive Validity: STOC results accurately predict simulated 
store sales. 
H2e. Actual Market Share Predictive Validity: STOC results accurately predict actual 
market shares. 
H2f. Product Price Insensitivity: STOC results correlate more highly with VCT results 
when product prices and price sensitivity are not included. 
The final three Wii video game experiments also allow us to test whether STOC prices more 
completely reflect individual self-preferences or rather individuals’ expectations of others, as 
summarized in the following two hypotheses. 
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H3a. STOC prices reflect E[Others]: STOC prices correlate more closely with traders' 
expectations of others (and with their prior expectations of STOC prices) than 
with traders' self-preferences. 
H3b. Learning: Traders’ estimates improve and converge after STOC trading. 
Finally, despite the fact that STOC prices capture traders’ consensus preferences, we can 
still test whether trading reveals individual preferences, since individual traders are subject to 
false consensus effects, and may bias their beliefs about other people based on self-preferences.  
In this instance, biases are a good thing since they may reveal preferences, which is STOC’s 
primary goal. 
H4. Individual Trading Bias: Traders exhibit bias based on self-preferences when 
trading, therefore individual trading reveals individual self-preference. 
5 Results of STOC Tests 
Before reporting the STOC test results, we need to identify the metric that best 
summarizes trading.  Volume-Weighted-Average-Price (VWAP) which capture all of the trades 
from start to finish during a trading game, weighting each trade price by the number of shares 
traded, correlates to the validation data better and more consistently than the five alternative 
metrics shown in Figure 4 (median, low price, mean, closing price, and high price).  Therefore, 
in subsequent reporting we utilize VWAP, normalized to sum to 100, when analyzing STOC 
results. 
## Insert Figure 4 here ## 
VWAP’s observed superiority is consistent with Shin and Dahan (2010) in which they 
model whether STOC market prices conform to a stationary or non-stationary process.  They 
analyze the same trading data as in the present research, and employ unit-root tests to verify the 
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stationarity or lack thereof of the mean prices for each security, and find that STOC security 
prices are, in fact, stationary.  Their model is: 
(2)    
where α is an intercept term for each stock, DIFF is the difference between the current stock 
price, P, and that stock’s volume-weighted average price (VWAP) up to time t, and the errors, 
the e’s, are autoregressive and follow a white noise process (w.n.), i.e. a sequence with zero 
mean, constant variance, and no serial correlation (Enders 2004). 
In Shin and Dahan’s empirical analysis, the αi’s for each stock are highly correlated to 
our VWAP values, and their results support the conclusion that an ideal STOC metric should 
include all trades.  Importantly, applying Shin4 and Dahan’s test of stationarity to all of our 
STOC data, we find that all of our trading experiments pass the stationarity test at the 95% 
confidence level.  That is, they do not follow a random walk in which the next trade is equally 
likely to be above the current stock price or below it.  In fact, their model correctly predicts 
whether the price of each stock will rise or fall in the next trade 72.1% of the time vs. a 50-50 
guess.  This stationarity occurs because there is no outside information entering the market 
during a STOC game, only the individual preferences and beliefs about others that exist at the 
time trading begins, and what is revealed through the price mechanism as the game unfolds.  One 
way of interpreting this result is that STOC works like traditional market research in which 
trades represent a random sample drawn from a stationary distribution.  We will utilize this 
important stationarity result when analyzing the data at the individual trader level for 
Hypothesis 4 by comparing each trade made against these stationary VWAP’s. 
                                                 
4 We thank Professor Hyun Shin for his assistance with these analyses. 
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Table 4 summarizes the hypothesis testing based on results from all eleven STOC 
experiments.  Ten of the eleven hypotheses are confirmed with remarkably strong results.   
## Insert Table 4 here ## 
Hypothesis 2 Confirmed 
In the majority of cases, STOC correlates well with virtual concept testing and constant-
sum voting (H2a confirmed), self-stated preferences and conjoint analysis (H2b confirmed).  
Most of the experiments showed good test-to-test reliability (H2c confirmed), especially with 
similar or identical groups of traders, but there were two notable exceptions.  The fourth 
crossover test, with only 16 global executives trading, did not correlate well with the other three 
STOC tests.  Similarly, the second Wii video game STOC test had virtually no correlation with 
the first Wii video game test, even though both tested the same eight products.  The most likely 
explanation is that the two groups of traders had wildly different preferences (as evidence of the 
difference between the two groups, we note that they had a correlation of only 0.02 between their 
average self-preferences).  So, while H2c is confirmed and we believe that STOC is reliable and 
repeatable, we caution that STOC measures consensus preferences of that particular group of 
traders, so as with other market research methods, a representative sample is required. 
The results for Hypothesis H2d, that STOC correlates with simulated store sales, seem 
equivocal because the first test depicting laptop bags in a tabular format failed while the second 
test depicting the same bags in simpler images succeeded remarkably well.  The difference 
between the two tests was only in the stimuli employed, not the underlying product concepts.  
Simply put, the tabular format for the eight Laptop PC bags failed miserably, while the simple 
images of each bag and its featured were much better understood.  So H2d is confirmed, given 
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effective stimuli.  The lesson is that stimuli matter in STOC, as in other market research 
methods, and pre-testing of stimuli is advised. 
Insert Table 5 here ## 
While the success of STOC in predicting market shares in a simulated store suggests that 
the method could be used in forecasting potential real world sales of product concepts, we urge 
caution.  Simulated stores control for many marketing mix variables, such as advertising, brand 
equity, and product availability, that are not controlled in actual product markets.  The next result 
highlights the risks of using STOC to predict actual sales. 
The only rejected hypothesis is H2e, i.e. that STOC predicts actual market shares, and it 
is convincingly rejected based on all four crossover vehicle experiments.  The failure of STOC to 
predict actual vehicle market share makes intuitive sense when one considers that STOC 
measures vehicle preferences without respect to vehicle price, not what respondents would 
actually buy given budget and product availability constraints.  This result highlights the earlier 
distinction between prediction markets, which measure expectations about future observable 
outcomes, versus STOC, which measures preferences for product concepts. 
Confirming Hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c the results from the two bike pump 
experiments show a remarkable agreement with those from the Dahan and Srinivasan study 
despite fundamental differences between the two methods, and wide separation in time and 
location.  The detailed results in Table 5 reveal a high degree of correlation between both STOC 
tests and Dahan and Srinivasan’s original bicycle pump validation data.  Table 7 calculates the 
mean absolute errors between any two sets of choice share predictions, and shows that STOC 
fared well in measuring preferences based on the Web static images. 
Insert Table 6 and Table 7 here ## 
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Differences include those in the data collection mechanism (a virtual security market in 
the STOC case, versus a virtual shopping experience in the Dahan and Srinivasan study), the 
modeling of the predicted market share (the use of relative security prices with STOC versus 
individual level conjoint analysis in the other study), the questions asked (the group prefers in 
STOC, versus what you prefer in the others study), and lastly the subject population (Stanford 
students of all types with Dahan and Srinivasan study and MIT MBA students with STOC). 
Table 8’s crossover test results also confirm H2a and H2c.  “Self-stated” survey data 
represent the normalized market shares for vehicles ranked by each individual in the top three 
out of eight choices.  “VCT w/Prices” represent vehicle market shares based on scoring in the 
top three of eight vehicles using Dahan and Srinivasan’s 2000 methodology and accounting for 
the price of each vehicle when calculating utility.  “VCT NO Prices” is the same calculation, but 
based only upon vehicle preferences without accounting for vehicle prices in the utility 
calculations.  And, as before, “STOC” represents the normalized market shares based on the 
volume-weighted average prices of each of the eight securities.   
## Insert Table 8 here ## 
Two notable results follow from this analysis: 
1.  H2e is rejected: STOC failed to predict actual vehicle sales: The first row of Table 
8, in which correlations to actual 2001–2006 unit sales of the eight vehicles were 
calculated for each method, reveals that all four STOC tests did not predict actual 
sales, so Hypothesis H2e is rejected.  This result confirms our point that STOC 
markets are not prediction markets, but rather measure underlying preferences among 
the traders, not intent to purchase.  On the other hand, self-stated choices and virtual 
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concept testing with pricing did predict actual unit sales (correlations in the 0.42 to 
0.63 range), though the results are not statistically significant.  The superiority of 
VCT and self-stated choice over STOC derives from the distinction between what 
people prefer, and what they are willing to pay.  STOC zeroes in on preference rather 
than willingness-to-pay.  Also, vehicle prices were not highlighted in STOC tests 1, 2 
and 4, and were only emphasized to traders during test 3, which was the only STOC 
test with at least some predictive value (0.52, but again not significant). 
2.  STOC captures preferences well, but not price sensitivity: All four crossover tests 
reveal that STOC accurately measured vehicle preferences without considering 
vehicle pricing.  Consider the crossover vehicle STOC results in Table 8.  When 
vehicle prices are left out of the analysis, STOC correlates remarkably well with the 
virtual concept test results (correlations of 0.80, 0.97, 0.72 and 0.83, respectively, for 
Tests 1 through 4).  But when vehicle prices and respondent price sensitivity are 
factored in, the correlations between STOC and VCT disappears (correlations of -
0.10 to 0.31).  STOC traders focus on vehicle preferences, not on willingness-to-pay.  
So Hypothesis 2f is confirmed: STOC traders reveal their product concept 
preferences, but not necessarily their intent to buy nor their price sensitivity. 
Hypothesis 3 Confirmed 
Results for the first two Wii Video Game tests are shown in Table 9.  The high 
correlations between aggregate individual preferences and E[Others] (0.94, 0.94, and 0.88), and 
between E[STOC Prices] and STOC VWAP (0.93, 0.94, and 0.63) confirm strong wisdom-of-
crowds effects.  While many individual respondents and traders do not accurately estimate 
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others’ preferences, aggregating their individual beliefs produces an accurate estimate of 
aggregate preferences because most of the individuals’ errors cancel out. 
## Insert Table 9 here ## 
While the results for the individual tests are remarkably good, the correlations between 
test 1 and test 2 for the same eight Wii video game concepts are virtually nonexistent, 
highlighting the earlier point that differences in trader populations will reflect in STOC results. 
The tests also confirm H3a, that STOC measures expectations of others more so than 
self-preferences.  In all three tests, the correlations between E[Others] and volume-weighted-
average-STOC-prices (VWAP) are significant and higher than those between VWAP and SELF 
preferences (e.g. 0.91 vs.0.89 in Test 1, 0.79 vs. 0.69 in Test 2, and 0.66 vs. 0.32 in Test 3).  
Traders rely more heavily on their beliefs about other traders than on their personal preferences 
when trading.  This is especially evident in Test 3 as seen in Table 10. 
## Insert Table 10 here ## 
Traders learn from each other, confirming Hypothesis H3b as evidenced by Post-STOC 
trading results outperforming E[STOC Prices] measured just prior to trading in all three tests. 
Comparisons to conjoint analysis for the three Wii Video Game tests are shown in Table 
11, and indicate that the competition between STOC vs. Conjoint Analysis is essentially a draw. 
## Insert Table 11 here ## 
STOC outperforms conjoint analysis in estimating SELF preferences for two of the three 
Wii Video Game tests, as the values in the lower row of Table 11 exceed those in the upper row 
for tests 1 and 2.  Conjoint analysis outperforms in test 3, although neither method does 
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particularly well in that test.  Overall, having the information from both methods would be 
superior to depending on either one alone, and STOC trading of attributes and levels could act as 
an input into conjoint analysis when trying to narrow from many possible attributes to a 
manageable few.  Also, STOC may prove more useful in measuring preferences for attributes 
such as product aesthetics and ease-of-use  that are difficult to measure using conjoint analysis. 
Hypothesis 4 Confirmed 
Consider Table 12’s four possible outcomes for any given stock trade between two 
individuals.   
## Insert Table 12 here ## 
While traders do not know the VWAP in advance of trading, the researcher can precisely 
measure those numbers in hindsight.  We learned earlier that STOC VWAP’s are stationary.  If 
each trader’s portfolio is ultimately valued at these VWAP’s, then each trade can be viewed 
retrospectively as having been profitable or not.  In fact, we recommend that traders be informed 
that winners will be determined based on final portfolios priced at VWAP, not closing price, to 
align incentives and reduce gaming in the closing minutes of STOC competitions.  Selling shares 
above VWAP or buying below VWAP, as shown in the black boxes, would be profitable.  But 
selling below VWAP might indicate an “abnormal” dislike for a particular stock.  And buying a 
stock above VWAP might reveal a strong preference for the concept associated with that stock.  
Below, we test these hypotheses empirically by looking at the 50% of transactions in the off-
diagonal, white cells.  The goal is to detect individual preferences in the trading data. 
Appendix 2 develops a metric measuring trader ’s bias for stock : 
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(3) 
    
, 
where the  measures trader n’s relative bias for stock m using the volume-weighted trades 
made by that person for that stock in the off-diagonal cells of Table 11, and measures the 
volume-weighted variance of stock m’s price relative to its volume-weighted mean (VWAP).  
We note that each trader’s biases for all m stocks sum to 100%, and can therefore be compared to 
the constant sum survey results.  We can compare the individual trader’s bias  against known 
preferences from the individual-level survey data.  The key result, depicted in Figure 13, is that 
trading reveals preferences at the individual level. 
## Insert Figure 13 here ## 
Two primary findings regarding individual level preferences confirm Hypothesis H4: 
• Individuals are subject to false consensus biases: There are strong positive 
correlations between the survey of self-preference and each respondent’s expectation 
of others. This implies that most individuals’ expectations of others is strongly 
biased by self-preference, consistent with the false consensus bias.  Note that we saw 
a similar effect at the aggregate level for the Wii game concepts in Table 9 and Table 
10, where the correlations between mean self-preferences and mean expectations of 
others were extremely high and significant (0.94, 0.94 and 0.88, respectively). 
• Individuals trade based on their biases: More interestingly, individual trader 
preferences measured with the trading bias metric are positively correlated with the 
survey of self-preference data (mean ρ = 0.25), and even more so with the 
individuals’ E[Others] (mean ρ = 0.46), which in turn are highly correlated with self-
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preferences (mean ρ = 0.61).  While STOC was not primarily designed to measure 
preferences at the individual level, the method reveals traders’ personal biases for 
and against the product concepts being tested.  As in conjoint analysis, STOC 
measures implicit preferences rather than requiring explicitly stated preferences. 
## Insert Figure 14 here ## 
Figure 14 compares the ability of individuals to estimate others’ preferences against the 
extent to which they rely on those estimates when trading, and reveals that individuals who 
estimated others better relied more on their own preferences when trading, while traders who 
poorly predicted others’ preferences followed the market rather than trading based on their own 
beliefs.  One explanation for this remarkable result is that market prices tend to confirm the 
beliefs of those who start trading with accurate estimates, while those whose estimates are far off 
the mark adjust their trading after learning market prices.  That is, they learn from the STOC 
market, providing further confirmation of Hypothesis 3b. 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we study a novel application of the market mechanism: the use of securities 
markets to aggregate and infer diverse consumer preferences.  We implement this idea in the 
specific context of eleven product-concept testing studies that aim to predict potential market 
share for between eight to eleven product prototypes.  During our research, we confirm four 
hypotheses about STOC: 1)  games are more popular and cost efficient than surveys; 2) STOC 
passes validity tests, but is not a prediction market; 3) the method measures consensus 
expectations of others; and 4) uncovers individual preference too, not just those of the crowd. 
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We observe that, unlike financial and prediction markets, STOC prices regress towards 
stationary means due to the absence of outside information.  Ten of the eleven STOC 
experiments are remarkably consistent with several common preference measurement 
techniques.  But stimuli must be clear and salient, and traders need to be trained and properly 
primed prior to trading.  STOC reveals individual heterogeneity through trading biases. 
We caution that the STOC methodology was not designed to measure individual 
preferences.  Conjoint analysis is likely more effective in that context, especially in measuring 
price sensitivity and attribute tradeoffs.  However, STOC does reveal individual preferences 
indirectly.  But STOC requires simultaneity and technical infrastructure that other methods 
would not need, thus posing challenges to its widespread adoption.  To STOC market reliability 
in some marketing applications, one may need to anchor the values of the securities to some 
objective fundamental variables of the corresponding product concepts.  To test market share 
predictions, for example, one could compare security values with the realized market shares of 
the subset of products that already exist, or, barring the existence of real market share data, with 
the outcomes of external customer choice surveys.  We hope to refine STOC market methods 
along these and other lines in future research. Finally, confidentiality needs to be considered 
while using STOC, as product information is revealed in the process.  Experimental design 
solves this issue using STOC’s scalability by making each trader aware of a subset of concepts. 
Despite the challenges, STOC offers two primary advantages relative to traditional 
market research methods: 
• Cost efficiency: The fact that respondents prefer competing in the STOC game to 
taking surveys, combined with the efficiency of STOC’s market pricing 
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mechanism in aggregating preferences, reduces recruiting and respondent 
compensation costs by as much as 75% for any given number of concepts. 
• Scalability: The ability to conduct a large number of concept tests quickly and 
simultaneously, limited only by the number of respondents, is particularly 
beneficial.  STOC serves as an early phase screening mechanism for concepts 
flowing from crowdsourcing, open innovation, or particularly prolific product 
innovation within the firm during new product development. 
The efficacy of STOC markets at identifying winning concepts may not surprise 
economists.  After all, Keynes (1936) commented on the similarities between stock selection and 
a beauty contest over seventy-four years ago: 
...professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions 
in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred 
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly 
corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole ...” 
The analogy is perhaps more accurate for describing what happens in financial markets and 
STOC games in the short run.  After all, over the long run financial stock prices depend not only 
on investors’ subjective beliefs and expectations of others, but also on other objective 
information such as companies’ earning potentials and valuations of assets.  On the other hand, 
the trading experiments presented in this paper are precisely “beauty contests,” since values of 
the virtual securities are derived endogenously from the preferences of the market participants, 
and their expectations of others’ preferences, both of which are largely subjective. 
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Appendix 1: Derivation of Equation (1) 
Equation (1) can be derived by considering the two primary, people-related costs of running a market 
research study: (a) those costs associated with recruiting potential respondents and (b) those for 
compensating people who actually participate. 
 
which we summarize with the following notation: 
(1) . 
where, 
Symbol Description 
Nsample Number of required Respondents 
qrespondent question capacity per respondent 
crecruit cost to recruit each person 
crespondent compensation for each respondent 
r% response rate 
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Appendix 2: The Trading Bias Metric 
Below, we develop a trading-based metric to measure individual biases and the 
preferences those biases imply. 
• Denoting stocks using and individual traders using  
• Let  be the price of the trade of stock for trader  
• : volume-weighted average price for stock . 
• : volume (# of shares) of the  of Km,n trades of stock for trader  
• : side of trade (buy or sell) stock for trader . 
• : indicator function which returns 1 if trader n bought shares above 
the  or sold shares below the  and 0 otherwise. 
 
• : volume weighted standard deviation of stock , which equals 
 
• : volume weighted z-score of stock for trader , which equals 
    
We now define trader ’s bias for stock as the following standardized metric: 
(2) .   
Note that each trader’s biases for all m stocks sum to 100%, and can therefore be compared to 
the constant sum survey results. 
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Table 1: Five Routes to Lower Respondent Costs in Concept Testing 
Symbol Description Challenge To Lower Cost STOC’s potential Benefit 
Nsample Number of required Respondents 
Statistical 
power Reduce  Nsample 
 Lower due to interactions with others  and multiple answers per respondent 
qrespondent question capacity per respondent 
Bounded 
rationality Increase  qrespondent 
 Higher due to motivation and ability  to self-select questions to be traded 
crecruit cost to recruit people 
People avoid 
surveys Reduce  crecruit 
 Lower because recruits are attracted to playing the game, even multiple times 
crespondent compensation for respondents 
People value 
their time Reduce  crespondent 
 Lower due to the intrinsic pleasure of playing the game itself 
r% response rate 
Many people 
opt out Increase  r% 
Higher due to intrinsic pleasure of game, 
desire to play again, competitiveness 
Table 2: Data Collected for each of Four Product Categories 
Method 
Product type 
Experiment STOC 
Method 
Conjoint 
Analysis 
Virtual 
Concept Test 
Self-Stated 
Choices 
Simulated 
Store 
Longitudinal 
Sales Data 
   
Bike 
Pump 
Concepts 
 
Tests 1 & 2 
n = 28 
9 Pumps; 
Same traders 
tested twice 
Rank 18 full 
profiles, est. 10 
parameters 
w/LINMAP 
n = 141 
Dahan and 
Srinivasan ’00 
VCT Physical, 
VCT Web; 
n = 102, 87 
   
Test 1  
n = 50 
Table of 8 
Laptop Bags 
    
Actual 
Laptop 
Bags Test 2  n = 62 
Images of 8 
Laptop Bags 
   
Toubia, et. al. 
2003 unit shares 
for 8 bags sold in 
the simulated 
store; n = 143 
 
Test 1  
n = 49 
8 vehicles 
No Prices 
 VCT with and 
without Prices 
Top 3 of 8 
with prices 
 
Test 2  
n = 43 
8 vehicles 
No Prices 
 VCT with and 
without Prices 
Top 3 of 8 
with prices 
 
Test 3  
n = 42 
8 vehicles 
With Prices 
 VCT with and 
without Prices 
Top 3 of 8 
with prices 
 
Actual 
Crossover 
Vehicles 
Test 4  
n = 16 
8 vehicles 
No Prices 
 VCT with and 
without Prices 
  
Cumulative 
units sold  
for each of 8 
vehicles from 
2001-2006 
per Ward’s 
Automotive 
News 
Test 1 
n = 35 
8 Own Wii 
Video Games 
  
Test 2  
n = 55 
8 Others’ Wii 
Video Games 
  Wii Video 
Game 
Concepts Test 3  
n = 58 
11 Own Wii 
Video Games 
Rank 16 full 
profiles, est. 10 
parameters w/ 
LINMAP 
n = 35 & 65 
Constant Sum Allocation  
of 100 Points across 8 or 11 
Wii Games in (4) Surveys: 
• SELF Preferences 
• E[Others’ Preferences] 
• E[STOC prices] 
• E[Actual Share] 
   after STOC game 
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Table 3: Five Key Steps to Designing and Executing a STOC Experiment 
Step Description Challenges Key Considerations 
1 Choose STOC 
Concepts 
Narrowing from many 
options 
Stocks should clearly and concisely depict multiple 
product concepts that differ from each other.  Not 
every trader has to see every stock. 
2 Define STOC 
Prices 
Open-ended vs. 
precise definition 
Traders need to understand the definition of each 
stock, e.g. “the % of people who prefer this 
concept” or “market share of this product” 
3 Define & Teach 
Trading Method 
Programming & User 
Interface 
The user interface should be easy-to-use, 
informative about the trading activity for each 
security and trader performance 
4 Trading & Data 
Collection 
Need Simultaneous 
trading; Trader Errors 
Transaction details between any two traders needs 
to be recorded: security name, volume, price, 
timing.  Traders should be able to review, edit and 
cancel open orders that have not cleared. 
5 Data Analysis Choosing a metric; What is measured? 
The metric should include all information such as 
the number of shares traded and at which price 
(not just closing prices) 
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Table 4: Summary of Eleven Experiments and Hypotheses 
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Table 5: Correlations Between (2) Laptop Bag STOC Tests 
and Simulated Store Unit Sales 
 
Table 6: Correlations Between (2) Bicycle Pump STOC Tests  
and Validation Data From Dahan and Srinivasan (2000) 
 
Table 7: Mean Absolute Error (MAE) Between (2) Bicycle Pump STOC Tests  
and Validation Data From Dahan and Srinivasan (2000) 
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Table 8: Correlations Between (4) Crossover Vehicle STOC Tests and Validation 
Data from Actual Unit Sales, Self-Stated Choices, and Virtual Concept Tests 
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Table 9: STOC Prices for (8) Wii Game Concepts vs. Constant Sum Surveys of SELF Preferences, 
E[Others’ Preferences], E[STOC Prices], and Post-STOC Estimates in Two Experiments 
 
Table 10: STOC Prices for (11) Wii Video Game Concepts vs. Constant Sum Surveys of SELF 
Preferences, E[Others’ Preferences], E[STOC Prices], and Post-STOC Estimates 
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Table 11: Predicting Aggregate SELF preferences: STOC vs. Conjoint Analysis  
r-Squared, and Rank Correlation for 3 Tests (winners in bold) 
 
Table 12: Trades between individuals are profitable for one person and unprofitable  
for the other; unprofitable trades reveal individual preferences and trading biases 
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Figure 1: Crossover Vehicle Trader Attitudes Before and After Trading ( n = 77 ) 
 
Figure 2: Attributes for Bike Pumps, Crossover Vehicles, Laptop Bags, and Wii Video Games 
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Figure 3: (11) Bike Pump Product Concepts Underlying the STOC Securities 
 
Figure 4: Which STOC Metric Correlates Best to Validation Data? 
Mean Correlation to Validation Data for (6) Six Metrics in Five STOC Tests 
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Figure 5: (8) Eight Crossover Vehicles 
 
Figure 6: (8) Eight Laptop PC Messenger Bags in a Tabular Format 
 
Figure 7: Laptop PC Messenger Bags Depicted Visually without a Tabular Format 
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Figure 8: Wii Video Game Concepts Developed by 35 students on (8) competing teams 
 
Figure 9: Wii Video Game Concepts Developed by 55 students on (11) competing teams 
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Figure 10: Typical Product Concept Information for 
Bike Pumps, Crossover Vehicles, Laptop PC Bags 
             
Figure 11: STOC Trading User Interface 
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Figure 12: Price and Volume History of AirStik 
 
Test 1                                                               Test 2 
Figure 13: Individuals’ trade based on their own expectations of others, 
which depend on self preferences due to false consensus 
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Figure 14: Individuals who better estimate others’ preferences tend to  
rely more on their own biases when trading 
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Web Appendix 3: STOC Web Market Simulator 
In order to conduct market experiments, we developed software, which replicates the 
mechanisms of real-world market. The STOC Web Market is software implemented in Java, 
which provides a platform for different types of electronic markets on the World Wide Web. We 
designed the software to use it as control laboratory for software and/or human traders based 
simulations and experiments. 
1.1 Technical Description 
Figure 15: Abstract Level Design of STOC Web Market 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1, an abstract level design of the system defines roles of electronic market. 
The main roles are broken down into pieces as the following: order routing, match/execution, 
clearance/settlement, information dissemination, market administration, and market surveillance. 
When orders are received from traders, the market is responsible for routing the order to an 
appropriate internal order book, where market makers (or auctioneers) can match them with 
other orders. When multiple securities are traded, each order needs to be routed to an appropriate 
market maker who handles the same security. After orders are matched and executed by market 
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makers, they are cleared and settled. The clearing/settling refers to updating the market 
information such as last traded price, and traders’ portfolio information. Once orders are settled, 
traders are notified of updated market information and their portfolio holdings, which is the role 
defined as information dissemination. Throughout this process, appropriate market surveillances 
are taken place. The market surveillance is to monitor the orders to make sure that they are not 
violating the predefined market rules. Lastly, the system needs to be capable of administrating 
the rules of the market in terms of order matching, executing, clearing, and settling. 
The STOC Web Market is designed into several modules to fulfill such roles. The software is 
implemented in Java with database connectivity to store all trade related information in a 
database for further analysis. The market participants access the market via Java applet, which 
gets downloaded into their Web browser. The Java language provides several advantages such as 
portability, dynamic loading, multi-threading, and object serialization, which make it a 
convenient platform for implementing the inherent complexity of the market simulator. These 
factors are especially advantageous to our system since it uses Web technology. They made it 
possible for all users to interact with the system from any platforms and trade securities 
concurrently in the market. Also they have made possible to build a robust system with relatively 
limited time. The Figure 2 represents the Java modules we built for the simulator. In the rest of 
this section, we describe each module in more detail. 
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Figure 16: Components of STOC Web Market 
 
Market Server Module 
The market server module serves six major functions: order match/execution, information 
dissemination, order routing, clearance/settlement, market administration, and brokerage service. 
• Order Match/Execution: The order match/execution plays a central role in handling and 
executing the orders. One of the principal advantages of object-oriented programming is 
that we can easily incorporate different types of order match/execution schemes into the 
system. 
• Information Dissemination: The information dissemination is to provide market 
information to traders. The market server disseminates information in two ways: one is to 
disseminate information to all traders participating in the market, and the other is to 
disseminate information to a specific trader. In order to disseminate public information to 
all traders, the market server uses an object called a ‘Ticker Tape’, which all traders have 
direct access to. For example, security information is placed on the ‘Ticker Tape’ when it is 
traded, or when the bid/ask prices are altered by newly placed orders. It also provides other 
general market information – whether market is open or closed, opening time of market, 
55 
duration of sessions, and other market news. In order to disseminate information to a 
specific trader, market server directly sends information to the trader using private channel. 
Each client maintains the channel for direct communication with the market server. The 
private information such as trade confirmation and portfolio holdings are sent through this 
channel.  
• Order Routing: When orders are received, the market server routes them to an appropriate 
order book, which consolidates all orders of the same security.  
• Clearance/Settlement: After the trade has taken place, the market server clears the 
transaction between two counter parties by transferring cash and securities between buyer 
and seller. The role of market server as a clearinghouse is to update trader’s portfolio in the 
database. After the update, the market server provides updated portfolio information to the 
owner of that portfolio. The clearance/settlement can be implemented with different 
settlement rules and clearing procedures that may apply to different securities. For 
example, futures market has different settlement rules from those of the options market. 
• Market Administration: In order to administer the market, the software provides a 
console window for market administrator as depicted in Figure 3. The console window is to 
serve five major roles: opening and closing of the market, monitoring traders who are 
participating in the market, monitoring the market makers, configuring duration of 
sessions, and disseminating general market information to market participants. 
• Brokerage Service: The essence of the brokerage service is the maintenance of accounts. 
Traders open accounts through simple registration process. When a new trader opens up an 
account, the market server accesses the information stored in the database on how the 
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initial portfolio shall be created. Based on this information, the market server assigns 
predefined amount of fictitious money and shares of securities to the newly created 
account. 
Figure 17: A Console for Market Server 
 
Market Maker Module 
The STOC Web Market is a highly configurable market in two aspects, the market institutional 
structures (trading mechanisms) and the types of securities to be traded. The market structure is 
abstracted in the model of market makers. For each security traded in the market, different types 
of market makers can be integrated into the market in a “plug-and-play” manner. 
In the current STOC Web Market system, the market maker is not responsible for checking 
general market rules, but may wish to impose additional rules on its own clients for transactions 
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placed through the market maker itself. If so, the market maker should give appropriate error 
message of the rules that are violated to the trader. If no rules are violated, the market maker 
must note the order to market server module. In addition, if this order allows some sales to 
proceed, the market maker notes to market server module to consummate the sales. Each market 
maker should strive to fulfill orders eventually, of course; however, there is no requirement that 
it be done immediately. Also, multiple market makers can handle the same security. 
Figure 5: Client User Interface  
 
 
Client User Interface 
The traders can access the market using GUI interface developed in Java applet. The applet 
consists of two parts: signup/login and trading interface (Figure 5). In signup/login screen, trader 
can either register herself as a new user or login to the market with pre-existing user ID and 
password. After logging in, the client side protocol allows trader to do the followings using 
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trading interface: place and cancel orders, obtain updates on ongoing market activity, and obtain 
information on its own portfolio. 
Database Module 
The database is divided into two groups of tables; tables for defining the market, and tables for 
storing trading information. 
• Defining the Market: There are four entities that define the market; security information, 
users, initial value of portfolios, and market session. In order to setup a market, all of these 
information need to be provided. When trader registers as a new user, the trader’s 
information is stored in the ‘users’ table. At the same time, the trader’s initial portfolio is 
created in the ‘portfolios’ table based on the initial value, which are predefined in the 
database. 
• Storing Trading Information: There are mainly two types of trading information. One is 
order information and the other is sales information. The order information consists of type 
of security, side (buy or sell), price, and quantity. After the execution, the sales information 
is stored in ‘sale log‘ table. It is important to separate the two in the database since the first 
one is needed to show quote information, and the second one is used to determine the price 
of securities. 
1.2 Summary 
In summary, the main features of the STOC Web Market Simulator are: (1) automating trading, 
(2) modular design for market structure, and (3) an environment that allows effective interactions 
between traders. 
